Cognitive processes in categorical and associative priming: a diffusion model analysis

Cognitive processes and mechanisms underlying different forms of priming were investigated using a diffusion model approach. In a series of 6 experiments, effects of prime-target associations and of a semantic and affective categorical match of prime and target were analyzed for different tasks. Significant associative and categorical priming effects were found in standard analyses of response times (RTs) and error frequencies. Results of diffusion model analyses revealed that priming effects of associated primes were mapped on the drift rate parameter (v), while priming effects of a categorical match on a task-relevant dimension were mapped on the extradecisional parameters (t(0) and d). These results support a spreading activation account of associative priming and an explanation of categorical priming in terms of response competition. Implications for the interpretation of priming effects and the use of priming paradigms in cognitive psychology and social cognition are discussed

I like it because I said that I like it: evaluative conditioning effects can be based on stimulus-response learning

Evaluative conditioning (EC) effects are often assumed to be based on a learned mental link between the CS (conditioned stimulus) and the US (unconditioned stimulus). We demonstrate that this link is not the only one that can underlie EC effects, but that if evaluative responses are actually given during the learning phase also a direct link between the CS and an evaluative response-a CS-ER link-can be learned and lead to EC effects. In Experiment 1, CSs were paired with USs and participants were asked to evaluate the pairs during the conditioning phase. Resulting EC effects were unaffected by a later revaluation of the USs, suggesting that these EC effects can be attributed to CS-ER learning rather than to CS-US learning. Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1 with the difference that no evaluative responses were given during the learning phase. EC effects in this study were influenced by US revaluation, suggesting that these EC effects are mainly based on CS-US learning. In Experiment 3, it was shown that EC effects can be found even if the USs are entirely removed from the procedure and the CSs are only paired with enforced evaluative responses. Together the experiments show that the valence of a stimulus can change because of a contingency with an evaluative response

What you see is what will change: evaluative conditioning effects depend on a focus on valence

This study investigated whether evaluative conditioning (EC) effects depend on an evaluative focus during the learning phase. An EC effect is a valence change of an originally neutral stimulus (conditioned stimulus or CS) that is due to the former pairing with a positive or negative stimulus (unconditioned stimulus or US). In three experiments, the task focus during the conditioning phase was manipulated. Participants judged CS-US pairings either with respect to their valence or with respect to another stimulus dimension. EC effects on explicit and implicit measures were found when valence was task relevant but not when the non-valent stimulus dimension was task relevant. Two accounts for the valence focus effect are proposed: (1) An additional direct learning of the relation of CS and evaluative responses in the valence focus condition, or (2) a stronger activation of US valence in the valence focus condition compared to the non-valent focus condition

Feature-specific retrieval of the knowledge of having lied before: Persons and questions independently retrieve truth-related information

Previous research on event coding has shown that, by default, bindings are binary and elemental, that is, individual objects or single features of these objects can retrieve responses separately and independently. In our study, we applied these findings to the automatic retrieval of former deceptions. Specifically, we investigated whether the person or the question to which one has answered deceptively can retrieve this knowledge independently, or whether there is also evidence for configural retrieval processes that use a combination of person and question information to retrieve the truth status of former episodes. We found evidence for retrieval based on single cues (i.e., person or question), supporting that the elementary retrieval of episodes by independent cues also holds in the context of retrieving knowledge about former lies

Endorsement and embodiment of cautiousness-related age stereotypes

Endorsement of implicit age stereotypes was assessed with the propositional evaluation paradigm (PEP) in a high-powered, preregistered study, comprising samples of young ( n  = 89) and older ( n  = 125) adults. To investigate whether implicit age stereotypes shape the behavior via self-stereotyping (“embodiment”), we examined whether implicit endorsement of the belief of older (young) people being cautious (reckless) predicts older (young) individuals’ spontaneous behavior in a speeded response time task. In both age groups, we found significant implicit endorsement effects of age stereotypical beliefs. However, implicit endorsement effects of the cautiousness-related age stereotypes were unrelated to our indicators of spontaneous cautious/reckless behavior in the speeded RT task (as assessed with the parameter a of a diffusion model analysis) for both age groups. The same pattern of results (endorsement of age stereotypic beliefs but no relation with behavioral indicators) was found for explicit measures of age stereotypes. Replicating previous findings, implicit and explicit measures of cautiousness-related age stereotypes were uncorrelated. In sum, our findings provide evidence for the implicit and explicit endorsement of cautiousness-related stereotypical beliefs about old and young people; individual differences in belief endorsement, however, did not predict differences in spontaneous cautiousness-related behavior in a speeded RT task

'Although quite nice, I was somehow not attracted by that person': attitudes towards romantically committed opposite-sex others are immune to positive evaluative conditioning

Individuals who are motivated to find a romantic partner do not only have to detect desirable mating options but also have to prevent becoming committed to attractive but unpromising contacts. We thus propose that an acquisition of highly positive evaluations of already romantically committed opposite-sex others is prevented by self-regulatory processes. In two experiments, positive evaluative conditioning (EC) effects were obtained for facial photos (conditioned stimulus) of other opposite-sex singles when these pictures were paired with positive trait adjectives or odors (unconditioned stimulus). In line with our hypothesis, however, this positive EC effect did not obtain for faces of other persons who were presented as being already involved in a romantic relationship. The results demonstrate that the acquisition of positive attitudes during mate searching is modulated by self-regulatory processes that inhibit the emergence of futile commitments

Incongruency effects in affective processing: automatic motivational counter-regulation or mismatch-induced salience?

Attention is automatically allocated to stimuli that are opposite in valence to the current motivational focus (Rothermund, 2003; Rothermund, Voss, Wentura, 2008). We tested whether this incongruency effect is due to affective-motivational counter-regulation or to an increased salience of stimuli that mismatch with cognitively activated information. Affective processing biases were assessed with a search task in which participants had to detect the spatial position at which a positive or negative stimulus was presented. In the motivational condition, positive or negative affective-motivational states were induced by performance feedback after each trial. In the cognitive activation condition, participants memorised the word ogoodo or obado during the search task. The affective incongruency effect was replicated in the motivational condition, whereas an affective congruency effect obtained in the cognitive activation condition. These findings support an explanation of affective incongruency effects in terms of automatic counter-regulation that is motivational in nature

Interpreting Ambiguous Stimuli: Separating Perceptual and Judgmental Biases

Interpreting ambiguous situations is not a purely data-driven process but can be biased towards positive interpretations by top-down influences. The present study tries to identify the underlying processes of these top-down influences. There are two separable types of processes that can be influenced by motivational biases: A perceptual bias affects information uptake whereas a judgmental bias affects acceptance criteria for positive and negative outcomes. In the present study, motivated influences on perception and judgment were investigated with a simple color discrimination task in which ambiguous stimuli had to be classified according to their dominating color. One of two colors indicated a financial gain or a loss, whereas a third color was neutral. To separate perceptual and judgmental biases, Ratcliff’s (1978) diffusion model was employed. Results revealed motivational influences on perception and judgment